A system of this kind that we happen to know quite a lot about is the one controlling saccades, the movements we make in looking from one object to another. In the brainstem ( Fig. 1) , we can identify the neurons responsible for creating the precise patterns of command needed to throw the eye from one target to another, receiving instructions from semi-automatic circuits in the superior colliculus that can translate visual target position into suitable commands, while the higher cortical processes have the job of deciding which of all the potential targets that make up a visual scene is actually interesting enough to be worth looking at, something the colliculus is incapable of.
Conventionally, the left-hand side of Figure 1 would be called 'sensory' and the right-hand side 'motor ' . But what about the bits in the middle? Is there some line of demarcation, some frontier-post, at which we step from sensory to motor? Or is this a misguided question? In terms of the gradual transformation of sensory patterns to motor ones as they pass from one neural layer to the next within the brain, can it possibly make sense to draw some artificial boundary where stimulus becomes response?
Two arguments suggest it can. The first, only applicable to us humans, is that a region where electrical stimulation causes a conscious sensation can reasonably be called 'sensory', and one where movement is generated, without a sense of having willed it, 'motor'. For some areas at least, the results of such experiments are unequivocal. Stimulation of the visual cortex in conscious subjects [1] causes illusory visual perceptions called phosphenes; though the subject may well make eye movements in consequence, they are recognized as being 'willed'. Conversely, stimulation of motor cortex evokes movements that subjects typically say they were made to do, against their will [2] . But
Figure 1
The main pathways by which visual stimuli are transformed into saccadic eye movements. For clarity, inter-cortical pathways through thalamic nuclei have been omitted. Cortical areas are shaded. LGN, lateral geniculate nucleus; V1-V5, VOT, IT and MT, cortical visual areas; LIP, lateral intraparietal cortex; FEF and SEF: frontal and supplementary cortical eye fields; SNPR, substantia nigra pars reticulata. experiments of this kind can necessarily be performed only rarely, and although in principle they could be carried out for some of the more central cortical areas in the middle of Figure 1 , this has not yet been done.
There is, however, a second, less direct, way of distinguishing experimentally between sensory and motor systems, which can be used in animals. A feature of the brain -indeed its main purpose -is that specific responses are not exclusive to specific stimuli; on the contrary, one may learn to make virtually any response to any stimulus. Clearly, it would not make sense for the neural mechanisms of sensory processing -the detection, localization and recognition of a visual object, for exampleto be duplicated for every possible response that might be evoked. Equally, it would be absurd to have different motor circuits for reaching out to pick up a tin of soup rather than a tin of beans, simply because the stimuli are different. There is thus a kind of natural culmination of sensory processing at the point where an object has been recognized and its position identified; and it is natural to think of this as linked by some sort of cerebral telephone switchboard to fragments of motor repertoire. In other words, as we move from sensory input to motor output, we would expect to find a stage at which the response to a stimulus suddenly depends on the task about to be performed, whereas previously it depended solely on the stimulus itself.
This, in essence, is the approach adopted by Snyder et al. [3] in a recent study on neurons in the posterior parietal cortex of monkeys. The lateral intraparietal area (LIP; see Fig. 1 ) contains many cells that are active either when a saccade is about to be made to a visual target previously displayed at a particular location, or before an arm movement reaching out to it. Although these cells are ultimately driven by vision, unlike neurons further upstream in visual cortex they fire strongly in response to remembered targets as well as ones actually present. This kind of behaviour can be demonstrated in a 'delayed response' task (Fig. 2) . The monkey fixates a central target, while a peripheral cue is briefly flashed up; but he has been trained not to respond immediately to the peripheral target, but only when permission is given by extinguishing the fixation spot. In addition, the colour of the flashed target tells the monkey whether an eye or arm movement is required: red for a saccade, and green for a reach. Of the neurons examined in this way, the sustained activity during the delay was specific for either arm or eye movement in some two-thirds of the recorded cells, the remaining one-third firing for both responses.
One might well think that the tonic firing of these cells during the waiting period in itself shows that they are part of the motor, rather than the sensory, system, in the sense of coding for the task that is about to be performed. But this is not so, for one could regard this activity as merely reflecting the fact that the monkey's attention is focused on the location, even though the target is no longer visible. In neighbouring areas of parietal cortex, neurons often continue to fire in delayed tasks even when no subsequent movement is made [4] , so long as the monkey is attending to the location.
There is, however, a simple way of demonstrating that these cells really are task-dependent, rather than merely attentional, which is to train the monkeys to perform a dissociational task. Here, red and green targets are presented simultaneously on opposite sides, requiring a reach in one direction at the same time as an eye movement in Dispatch R349
Figure 2
Activity of neurons in monkey parietal cortex during 'saccade' and 'reach' trials, as described in the text. The lowest part of each panel shows the action potential density recorded during eight trials, and the histogram above shows their averaged activity. Each cell fires initially in response to either cue; thereafter, sustained firing occurs only before its own preferred task -saccade or reachand not the other. (Adapted from [3] .)
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Saccade Cue Reach the other. This procedure also gets round the problem that, in 'arm' tasks, an eye movement is often executed at the end of the reach as well, so that some neurons may show activity indiscriminately during either task, even though they are really coding only for eye movement.
This was indeed what Snyder et al. [3] found, the total percentage of genuinely task-specific cells rising as a result of using the dissociation task from 68% to 84%. Thus the evidence that neurons in these regions are taskspecific and not merely attention-dependent, motor rather than sensory, seems pretty clear.
A rather different approach to defining the sensorimotor boundary is exemplified by another recent paper, by Thompson et al. [5] . Again, eye movements of monkeys were measured during a visual task in conjunction with electrical recording, this time from neurons in the frontal eye fields (FEF; see Fig. 1 ). The neurons chosen for recording were in some ways similar to the ones in LIP described earlier: they respond to visual stimuli and continue firing until a subsequent saccade is made to the target. A trial started with the monkey fixating a central spot, which was suddenly extinguished and replaced with a ring of eight separate stimuli, one of the eight (the target) differing in appearance from the others, perhaps being red while the distractors were green: the monkeys' task was simply to make a saccade to look at the target.
Meanwhile, the experimenters recorded the electrical activity of a neuron whose receptive field covered one of the eight stimuli; thus, on some trials this neuron would 'see' the target, and on others a distractor. As had been reported earlier [6, 7] , the initial response to stimulus onset is essentially identical whether the neuron sees a target or a distractor. But over a period of some 200 milliseconds the activity shows a kind of evolution: if a distractor is present, the firing frequency gradually drops, but in the case of a target it is maintained until eventually a saccade is made. It is not until the two types of response finally part company that the cell can be said to 'know' which kind of stimulus -target or distractor -is actually present, and therefore whether or not a response is required.
The activity of these cells seems to reflect some kind of discriminatory decision process. But do they actually trigger the motor response? The answer is complicated by the inevitable existence of noise -random fluctuations of activity from trial to trial. If a very large number of responses in individual trials is plotted (Fig. 3) , it is clear that we need to think in terms of two stochastic populations of responses -one for the target and one for a distractor. These populations are at first statistically indistinguishable, but after some 100 milliseconds they begin to diverge, until by 150 milliseconds they barely overlap at all. Somewhere in between -actually around 120 milliseconds -the divergence reaches statistical significance, in the sense that the cell can reliably indicate whether a distractor or a target is present. Now, saccadic reaction times are indeed extremely variable: for a person whose mean latency is 200 milliseconds, one may well find that 5% of responses are shorter than 150 or longer than 250 milliseconds, and the range for the monkeys is similar. But by comparing sets of trials with long reaction times with those with short reaction times, it turns out that the variation in the time these cells take to discriminate between their stimuli is far smaller than that of latency as a whole. The conclusion must be that what dominates the variability of reaction time is not the initial stage of sensory discrimination, but a second process more in the nature of selecting and preparing for the eventual motor response. In fact, experiments with remembered, rather than immediate, targets reveal a population of cells in the monkey FEF whose properties seem much more closely to fit this second stage, and whose activity corresponds more closely with the variation in behavioural response. These are the visual movement cells, whose activity starts long in advance of a saccade, rises steadily to a relatively fixed threshold level, at which point a saccade is made, and then declines rapidly back to baseline. In a recent paper, Hanes and Schall [8] were able to show that the variation in the rate of rise of activity of such cells from trial to trial predicts closely the observed variation of saccadic latency itself, corresponding very well with a previous quantitative model [9, 10] of the statistical properties of saccadic latency in human subjects.
It thus begins to look as if there are at least two populations of cells in the FEF, corresponding broadly to a process of sensory discrimination on the one hand and of motor decision making on the other. As the two populations are intermingled, we unfortunately cannot apply the human test of whether stimulation generates movements against the subject's will, because of the inevitable spatial spread of either electrical or transcranial magnetic stimulation. A promising approach is to use countermanding tasks, in which a movement is cued but almost immediately cancelled by means of a second stimulus; by comparing the activity of both types of cell in those trials when the movement is or is not made, it should be possible to characterize still more exactly just how their activity may relate to processes of perception and volition.
